RECENT CASES.
BILLS AND NOrEs-OMI1ssIoN OF DRAWE.-HOLUaa

I,

Dim' Couasn.-In

a suit upon two bills of exchange, by an indorsce against the acceptor, the
instruments, when put in evidence, revealed that the space for the-drawee's
name had been left blank. Held: The plaintiff was not a holder in due
course, under the N. I. L., and the instruments were subject to the defense
that the acceptance had been procured by fraud. Clay and -Funkhouser
Banking Co. v. Dobyns,.255 S. W. 946 (Mo. 1923).
At the common law there was some difference of opinion as to the effect
of an instrument, in form a bill, which contained no drawee. Some courts
held that, as the instrument was not addressed to any one, the draweV-must
be taken to have assumed the obligation himself, and was liable on the instrument as a note. Alny v. Winslow, i26 Mass. 342 (879); 1Funk v.
Babbitt, is6 Ill. 408 (1895). The same result has been reached in one case
under the N. I. L. Didato v. Coniglio, 10o N. Y. Supp. 466 (19o6).
The better view, howeier, was that the drawer could not be held liable
on the instrument as a note, because there was no promise by him to pay.
Forward v. Thompson, 12 U. C. Q. B. 1o3 (1854); Watrous v. Halbrook,
39 Tex. 573 (1873). Under the N. I. L, it has been held the instrument
is not a note. Lehner v. Roth, 227 S. W. 833 (Mo. 1921).
After an instrument incomplete for lack of a drawee is accepted, it has
been held that this is an admission by the acceptor that he was the person
intended, and supplied the omission so that the instrument became a goo4
bill Gray v. Milner, 8 Taunt. 739 (1819); Wheeler v. Webster, i I. D.
Smith I (N. Y. i85o). The preferable view, however, was that the acceptance would not make the instrument a bill, but that the acceptor became
the obligor of a promissory note. Peto v. Reynolds, 9 Ex. 410 (1854);
Watrous v. Halbrook, supra; Bliss v. Burnes, McCahon 91 (Kan. z86o)..
Under the N. I. L. (sec. 52, paragraph i) a holder in due course is one
who has taken the instrument "complete and regular upon its face." Where
the instrument is incomplete in any essential particular, the person taling
it cannot acquire the character of a holder in due course. Hunter v. Allen,
127 N. Y. App. Div. 572 09o8); In re Estate of Phibpott, x69 Iowa 555
(1915).
It would seem, therefore, that the plaintiff in the principal case
was not a holder in due course of a bill of exchange, and that the court
was correct in its decision.
It is submitted, however, that had the plaintiff declared .upon the
instruments as promissory notes, he would have been entitled to recover.
By accepting the instrument, the defendant promised to pay the amount indicated unconditionally. The instrument, thereupon, became a !regular and
complete" promissory note, as defined in section 184 of the N. I. L, and the
plaintiff in the instant case was a holder in due course of such note.
CHArITABLE INSTITUTIONS-HoSPITALS'

LIABILITY TO PAYING PATIFa-TS.-.

Plaintiff, a paying patient, was burned by a hot-water bottle negligently put
in her bed by a hospital orderly. In an action against the hospital, the latter's defense was based on its immunity as a charitable organization. Held:
(443)
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No recovery.

Phillips v. Buffalo General Hospifal, 2o2 N. Y. Sup. 572

(1924).

In New York surgeons and fiurses have been held independent contracting parties and not servants of the hospital at all, the language there being
broad enough to include an orderly doing something of this kind for the
nurse. Schloendorg v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N. Y. 125, 1oS
N. E. 92 (19r4). The instant case, however, seems to assume the relationship between the parties and discusses the liability of the hospital as principal.
The immuniity of charitable institutions from liability for the negligence
of their servants is recognized in almost all jurisdictions. Some jurisdictions allow no plaintiffs to recover, regardless of the degree or form of the
negligence of the defendant. Fire Insurance Patrol v. Boyd, 12o Pa. 624,
IS AtI. 553 (1888) ; Adams v. University Hospital, 122 Mo. App. 675, 99 S.
W. 453 (I9O7) ; Roosen v. Brigham Hospital, 235 Mass. 66, x26 N. E. 392
(192o). See Glavin v. Hospital, 12 R. I. 411 (i897), contra. But the more
general rule is that a hospital is liable in all cases except those based on
the negligence of an apparently competent servant. This exemption applies
only to actions brought by patients. Horden v. Salvation Army, 199. N. Y.
a33, 92 N. E. 626 (igio) ; St. Paul's Sanitarium v. Williamson, 164. S. W. 36
(Tex. Civ. App., 1914). Taylor v. Flower Home, io4 Oh. St. 61, 135 N. E.
287 (1gz).
Although this immunity is generally admitted, the reasons given vary
exceedingly and are not entirely satisfactory. For a discussion of them, see
Ig MICH. L. R. 395 (1921); Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary, 191 Ala. 572, 08
So. 4 (i915) ; Weston v. Hospital of St. Vincent de*Paul, 131 Va. 587, 1o7

S. E. 785 (i921). The more usual explanation given in recent cases is that
it does not lie in the mouth of the beneficiary of the hospital's charity to
attack it for the negligence of its servants. Adams v. University Hospital,
supra;. Schloendorff v. New York Hospital, supra; Weston v. Hospital,
supra. A leading case likens the hospital to the good Samaritan, Powers v.
Massachusetts Homceopathic Hospital, iog Fed. 294, 47 C. C. A. i22 (igol).

Yet the hospital is held liable to a patient for negligence in the selection of
its nurses and surgeons. Hoke v. Glenn, 167 N. C. 594, 83 S. E. 807 (1914);
Taylor v. Flower Home, supra.
Under this theory the question arises as to the hospital's liability to a
paying patient. A hospital run for a profit will be responsible,4or injuries
to a patient resulting from the negligence of its servants. University of
Louisville v. Hammock, 127 Ky. 564, io6 S. XV. 219 (190); Stewart v.
California Medical Ass'n, 178 Cal. 418, 176 Pac. 46 (i918); Malcom v.
Lutheran Hospital, io7 Neb. ioi, 185 N. W. 350 (192i). So also will a
hospital not run for profit, where the patient pays the full price, according
to a few cases. Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary, supra; Morton v. Savannah
Hospital, 148 Ga. 438, 96 S. E. 887 (i9i8). Mullinger v. Evangelischer
Diakoniessenverein, 144 Minn. 392, 175 N. W. 699 (1920). -See i8 Micm. L
The great majority, however, have held as the instant
Rzv. 539 (92o).

case holds, and treat him as the recipient of charity, and do not permit him
to recover.

Burdell v. St. Luke's Hospital, 37 Cal App. 3io, 173 Pay. ioo8
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Mikota v. Sisters of Mercy, 183 Iowa t278, 168 N. W. 219
(iqi8);
(918) ; Weston v. Hospital, supra. In these cases "the feeling is that the
plaintiff, though paying the highest price asked, is still receiving more than
he pays for, and therefore should not be allowed to hold the hospital, even
as to funds received from other patients. See Gable v. Sisters of St. Francis,
227 Pa. 254, 75 At. io37 (igio). In the language of Cardozo, J., "Such a
payment is regarded as a contribution to the income of the hospital, to be devoted, like its other funds to the maintenance of .the charity."
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-IMPARMENT OF CONTRACTS.-The Supreme Court
of Iowa held that certain contracts were avoided by a statute, whereas, the
court had previously decided that such contracts were valid under the same
statute. It was assigned as error that on the faith of the latter ruling,
certain contracts had been entered into, and the new construction of the
statute was an impairment of the contracts in violation of the provisions of
the Federal Constitution. Held: Writ of error dismissed. Fleming v. Fleking, United States Supreme Court, No. 175, October Term, 1923.
It has been settled by a long line of decisions that the provision of Section io, Article i, of the Federal Constitution, protecting the obligation of
contracts against state action, is directed only against impairment by legislation and not by judgment of courts. A literal construction of the provision----"No state shall . . . pass any . . . law impairing the obligation of contracts,"--plainly warrants such a conclusion. PRR. Co. v. McClure,
io Wall. 5ii (i87o); Kryger v. Wilson, 24V U. S. 17i (x916); Columbia
Ry. v. South Carolina, 261 U. S. 236 (i923). As is pointed out by the court
in the principal case, the effect of the subsequent decision by the state court
is not to make a new law but only to hold that the law always meant what
the court now says it means.
-Aside from the above question as to the impairment of the obligation of
contracts, another problem arises. A distinction is drawn by the Supreme
Court between those cases coming to it by writ of error to the supreme
court of a state, and those in which the cause comes before the Federal
courts because of diversity of citizenship, and thence by app'eal to the Supreme Court. In the latter class of cases the Federal courts, under the
powers granted by the third Article of the Constitution, hold themselves
free to decide which, if any, of the decisions of the state courts dealing with
the state laws they will follow. Gelpcke v. Dubuque, i Wall. 175 (1863);

Burgess v. Seligman, 1o7 U. S. 20 (1882); Great Southern Hotel Company
It is generally stated that it is the duty
v. Jones, 193 U. S. 532 (1903).

of the Federal court in exercising its independent judgment to lean to an
agreement with the state court; but where a state court has reversed its
ruling as to a state law, the Federal court, to avoid injustice, will not usually
follow the later decision, when to do so will make it necessary to impair
the contracts (though the clause as to impairment is not involved) entered
into prior to the second decision. German Savings Bank v. Franklin Co.,
128 U. S. 526 (1888); Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Water Co., 177 U. S.
558 (i8).
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In cases where a writ of error is directed to a state court, the only
ground of Federal jurisdiction is the alleged violation of a right guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. In such cases the Supreme Court follows
the last decision of the state supreme court as to what the law of that
state is; but, as set forth in the principal case, the mere decision of a court
has never been held to have the effect of a legislative act. Muhlker v. N. Y.
R. R. Co., i97 U. S. 544 (9o4) ; Tidal Oil Co. v. Ilanagan, U. S. Supreme
Court, No. 179, October Term, i923; but see McCullough v. Va.,.172 U. S.
102 (1W).
AssiGNMENT-CONTRACTS-PRIORITY OF SUCCESsivE AssiGNEs.--The A
Co. assigned to X an indebtedness due it from the B Co. Later the A Co.
assigned the same debt to Y, who made no inquiries of the B Co. Y first
gave notice to the B Co. Hold: X has priority.- Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturerd? Finance Co., U. S. Sup. Ct., No. 74, October Term, 1923. Decided
Feb. 1S, x924.

There is a direct conflict of authority on the question whether, as between
successive assignees of the same debt who took in good faith, prior notice
to the debtor of the later assignment subordinates the rights of the earlier
to those of the later assignee. The English rule is well settled that whichever of several assignees first gives notice has priority on the ground that
the assignee must do all he can to take possession .(through analogy to sales
by vendor remaining in possession) and if he does not give notice, the assignor is thereby enabled to defraud a subsequent purchaser. Foster v.
Cockerell, 3 CL and F. 456 (1835); Ward v. Duncombe, L. IL 3 A. C. 369

('893).
The English rule is followed in many jurisdictions in the United States.
Phillips' Estate, 205 Pa. 515, 55 At. 213 (19o3) ; Jenkinson v. N. Y. Finance

Co., 79 N. J.Eq. 247, 82 At1. 36 (19ii) ; and prior to the principal case was
often stated to be the Federal rule; i Williston; Contracts, sec. 435; Metheven
v. S. I. Light Co., 66 Fed. 113, 13 C. C. A. 362 (i895). Just as many American jurisdictions, however, follow a contrary rule on grounds that the assignor has no title left to pass to any subsequent purchaser. Central Trust
Co. v. West India Imp. Co., 169 N. Y. 314, 62 N. E. 287 (igoi); Herman v.
Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 218 Mass. i81, io5 N. E. 450. Even under this
latter theory the subsequent assignee will be protected if in good faith he
obtains payment; Bridge v. Conn. Co., 152 Mass. 343, 25 N. E. 6r2 (i89o);
reduces his claim to judgment; Judson v. Corcoran, 17 How 612 (U. S.
1854) ; effects a novation with the debtor; N. Y. Co. v. Schuyler, 34 N. Y.
30 (i865); obtains the document containing the obligation in the case of a
specialty; Fisher v. Knox, 13 Pa. 6--2 (i85o); first complies with statutes
.. requiring recording; Whitcomb v. Waterville, 99 Me. 75. 58 A i68 ('9o4);
holds by an assignment which alone conforms to stipulations in the contract;
Fortunato v. Patten, 147 N. Y. 277, 41 N. E. 572 (1895); or if any circumstances create an equitable estoppel against the prior assignee. Rabinowitz v.
Peoples' Nat. Bank, 235 Mass. io2, xo5 N. E. 450 (i92o).
The court in the principal case seems to prefer the reasoning of the Massachusetts and New York rule, but points out that, even assuming the reason-
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ing of the English rule, the purchaser here was not injured through the fact
that the prior assignee gave no notice, since no inquiries were made of the
debtor.
CONTRACTS-CONSTRUCTION COXTRACTS-COST OF CoDA[LETo.-;.--Defendant

city contracted with plaintiff to build a bridge. The contract provided that on
abandonment the city might "secure a completion of the work . . . and
charge the cost to the contractor . . . which expense shall be deducted
from any moneys due the contractor under this contract." The contractor
ceased work in January, i9i8, when the bridge structure and false work had
been completed, but the concrete had not been poured. There was an ice
gorge above the bridge, and grave danger that unless the concrete was
poured promptly the gorge would break and so much of the structure as
was then in place would be carried away. The contractor owed back
wages to workmen, who refused to continue work on the ,brige unlessthe arrears were paid. Owing to the labor scarcity of wart'n.., other competent labor could not be obtaiped. The city paid the back wages, the
bridge was completed, and 'soon afterwards the i8 -;gorge did break and
carry away the false -wo , but the completed bidge was not injured. 'In
a suit by the contkPctor for money ducN k, the city claimed the amount
of %ack wages paid as a cost of completion. The contractor contended
that this was a mere voluntary payment. Held: This payment was a necessary expense, chargeable to the contractor under the contract. Hackendorn Contracting Co. v. Johnstozus City, 278 Pa. 442 (1z4).
In building contracts authorizing the owner to complete the work on
the contractor's default "at the contractor's expense," or to -complete the
work and "charge the cost to the contractor," when the contractor sues for
any money due him the owner can, of course, offset the cost of completion.
School Town of Winamac v. Hess, 1S1 Ind. 229, 50 N. E. 81 (1898);
Coppola v. Grande, 88 N. J. L. 324, 96 AtL 67 (i915); Halferty v. Marsch,
252 Pa. 137, 97 Atl. 196 (gI1).
The expression "cost of completion" in such contracts means "the actual amount necessarily expended . . . provided that the same is fair
and reasonable." Clark v. Fleishmann, 187 'N. Y. S. 807 (192); and Cf.
MeArthur v. Whitney, io4 Ill. App. 57o (19o2); Amdt v. Keller, 96 Wis.
274, 71 N. NV. 651 (1897).
To determine what expense is reasonably necessary in completing the
building is a simple question when the account includes only the a~rou.ts
spent on labor and material in the actual constructioqrwhether this be
completion from where the contractor left off; Hay V Bush, 11o La. 575,
34 So. 692 (19o3); Beach v. Wake6"d,-.-foj Iowa 567, ioS N. W.- 757
(1899); Wills v. Board of Educatioii 78 Mich. 26o, 44 N. W. 267 (1889);
or a rebuilding of work already done, to conform to the contractual requirements, followed by completion. Powers v. Yonkers, 114 N. Y. 145,.21

N. 1. 132 (1889).

The problem is more intricate when the money is expended on some
object not so closely connected with the work of building. The following
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expenses have been allowed as costs: settlement of claims for injuries done
to neighboring property in blasting. Newton v. Devlin, 134 Mass. 490
(1883); premiums for employers' liability insurance; Museum v. Amer.
97 N. E. 633 (i912); additional expense when
Bonding Co., 211 Mass. iz.,
some change in the plans becomes necessary. Rowe v. Peabody, 207 Mass.
226, 93 N. E. 604 (19ii). Sums paid for surgical assistance to workmen
injured during the progress of the work were nct allowed as costs in Newton v. Devlin, snpra. It has also been held that payment of the back wages
of the contractor's workmen, when no necessity for. this was shown, was
purely voluntary as against the contractor's surety; Newton v. Devlin, supra.
But the instant case is distinguished from this by the circumstances which
made the payment necessary to complete the contract, and the decision
seems not only sound in theory but also eminently just and fair.
CONTRACTS-FRUSTRATION-SUPERVENING

ILLEGALITY-RECOVERY OF MONEY

PAW.D-An Austrian shipbuilding company sued the defendant, a Scottish
company, to recover a part payment made in 1914 on a contract by the terms
of which the defendant was to build marine engines for the plaintiff. The
defendant's engineers prepared plans, but the engines were never built, due
to the intervention of the war, the plaintiff becoming an enemy alien. Held:
For the plaintiff. Cantiere San Roc.o Shipbuilding Co. v. Clyde Shipbuildilig Co., (5923) Scots Law Times 624.
At early common law, impossibility of performance did-hot'dissblve an
express unconditional contract. Paradine v. Jane, Aleyn 26 (Eng. 1647).
Today, courts imply a condition that subsequent performance is to be excused
where a contingency intervenes which the parties themselves, when they
made the contract, would have obviously regarded as terminating the obligation. See 66 U. OF PA. L. REv. 28. War is such an intervening contingency.
Horlock v. Beal, I. R. App. Cas. 48 (Eng., 1916); Zinc Corporation v.
Hirsch, L R. I K. B. 541 (Eng., 1916); Kronprinzessin Cecilie, 244 U. S.
12 (1917).
Where one party to the contract has advanced money to the other, and
the latter has been prevented from performing by the intervention of the
contingency, the civil law of Scotland allows a recovery of the money advanced on the ground of failure of consideration. Watson & Co. v. Shankland, lo M. i43 (Scotland, 1871); Davis & Primrose, Ltd. v. Clyde Shipbuilding Co., I Scots L. T. 297 (Scotland, I917). In England the law is
contra; a payment previously made cannot be recovered. The contract is
not rescinded ob iititio and the status quo restored as nearly as is possible,
but the contract remains valid and subsisting up to the moment at which
impossibility supervenes. Accrued rights remain, but the parties are free
irom subsequent liability. Chandler v. Webster, L. . i K. B. 493 (Eng.,
19o4); Civil Service Co-operative Society v. General Steam Navigation Co.,
L. R. 2 K. B. 756 (Eng., 1903).
The English decisions are based largely upon two lines of decisions
which hold, first, that a payment previously made on account -of freight
cannot be recovered back in the event of the ships being lost which carried
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the goods, and that no freight thereafter becomes payable; Allison v. Bristol
App. Cas. 2o9 (Eng., 1876); and second, that there
Insurance Co., L. R.
can be no recovery for uncompleted work upon property of another which
has been accidentally destroyed; Appleby v. Myers, L R. 2 C. P. 651 (Eng.,
1867) ; neither of which is generally law in the United States. Butterfield
v. Byron, 153 Mass. 517, 27 N. E. 667 (i89i); the Pehr Ugland, 2'7i Fed.
34o (i9z1). Contra: Brumby v. v. Smith, 3 Ala. r23 (1841) ; Taulbee v. McCarty, i44 Ky. 199, 137 S. W. 1045 (igii). The English rule is therefore
not followed in most American decisions, which are usually in accord with
the principal case. See Joyce.v. Adams, 8 N. Y. 291 (1853); Manhattan
Life Insurance Co. v. Buck, 93 U. S. 24 (1876); Jones-Gray Construction
Co. v. Stephens, 16" Ky. 765, 18I S. W. 659 (1916). Numerous American
decisions, however, have in effect adopted the English rule. Bruce v. Indianapolis Gas Co., "46 Ind. App. 193, 92 N. E. 189 (t9io); Cowley v.
Northern Pacific Railroad, 68 Wash. 558, 123 Pac. 998 (1912); but. see
Louisville Railroad v. Crowe, i55 Ky. 27, i6o S. V. 759 (I913).
It is submitted that the principal case represents the better view, since it
ascertains rfiore clearly the respective rights of the parties. The English
doctrine, while a rough and ready solution of a difficult problem, is obviously, in many instances, unjust. See 3 Williston, Contracts, sec. 1974.
DxvoacF-DNiED WHuM MARRIAGE WAS IN VIoLATIoN oF STA-UT-A
and B were husband and wife living in the District of Columbia. A obtained
a divorce from B on the ground of adultery. Ch. 966 of D. of C. Laws provides that "in such case only the innocent party may remarry." Six years
later, while still living in the same jurisdiction, B married C in Maryland.
She then returned and continued her previous residence. B asks divorce and
alimony from C on grounds of cruelty. Held: Bill dismissed. Olverion v.
Olverson, 293 Fed. 1oi5 (i923).

The act of marrying was stated to be illegal and the court refused 'to
recognize the marriage so as to aid B, nor would the court relieve -her
from the obligations thus assumed.
A litigant who bases his action on an illegal act cannot succeed, Hunter
v. hVeate, 289 Fed. 604 (1923), and in equity one must have clean hands,
Wilde v. Wilde, 37 Neb. 891, 56 N. W. 724 (1893). In divorce these maxims have been applied where libellant induced respondent not to defend;
Lanktree v. Lanktree, 42 Cal. App. 648, 183 Pac. 954 (1919), and will probably be extended to cover the so-called "insincerity cases," where the libellant has a good action but seeks a divorce to attain some collateral end.
Kirschbaum v. Kirschbaum, 92 N. J. Eq. 7, 111 At. 697 (192o). But Cf.
Wille v. Wille, 88 N. J. Eq. 581, 1o3 At. 74 (i918). As regards the petition for alimony, the maxims were correctly applied in the principal case,
provided the act actually was illegal in the District of Columbia.
Where a statute has in general terms (as above) prohibited a guilty
party from remarrying, the weight of authority construes it to have no
extra-territorial effect, so that the act of marrying outside the state would
not be illegal. Medway v. Needhant, 16 Mass. 157 (819); State v. Shattuck, 69 Vt. 403, 38 AtL 8x (i897); In re Chace, 25 R. . 351, 58 At. 978
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(i9o4). And the intent to evade the law should properly be immaterial.
Van Voorhis v. Brintnall, 86 N. Y. iS (188r). Some courts, however, regard such a statute to express a "public policy so distinctive" that they will
construe it to have extra-territorial force. Pennegar v. State, 87 Tenn. 244,
Stull's Estate, 183 Pa. 625, 39 AtI. 16 (1898). The
10 S. V. 305 (1889).
court does not discuss this point but must follow the second view. As regards the divorce action by itself, if the court has decided the marriage itself illegal, there wvould seem to be no need' for a divorce in the
District of Columbia. It is probable, however, that the Court regards the
marriage itself a binding contract although the libellant was breaking a
court order to enter it, and leaves the parties where they stand as a punishment.
CONCEALMIFxT OF AGn-EoRSTOPPF-Plaintiffs,
INFANCY-FRAUDULFSZT
whose personal appearance and business activities were those of adults, and
whom the defendant, to the knowledge of plaintiffs, believed to be such, purchased from the defendant a lease of a coal mine, paying for the same $2ooo.
They bring this action at law to recover judgment for the amount paid
on the ground that they were in fact infants at the time, and now repudiate
the contract. Held: They are estopped to avoid the contract. Young, et
al. v. Daniel, 255 S. W. 854 (Ky. 1923).
Although there is great diversity of opinion on the subject, the weight of
authority probably is that, when the action is at law, the infant is not
estopped by his false representations as to age from using his defense of
infancy as a shield when his contract is sought to be enforced against him;
or in disaffirming the contract and recovering the consideration paid by him.
International Text Book Co. v. Connelly, 2o6 N. Y. 188 (1912); Leslie v.
Sheill, 3 K. B. 6o7 (1914); Knudson v. General Motorcycle Sales Co., 23o
Mass. 34, 119 N. E. 359 (1917). The reasoning on which these cases proceped is that to estop the infant would be in fact to contradict the principle
of law that his contracts of this kind are voidable. Williams v. Baker, 7r,
Pa. 4A0 (1872).
There are, however, well considered cases the other way. In addition
to the principal case, see Smith v. Cole, 148 Ky. 138, 146 S. IV. 30 (1912),
and Rosa v. Nichols, 92 N. J. L. 375, io3 Ati. 201 (i9i8), in which it is held
the infant will not be permitted to use the advantages given him in defrauding others.
When the infant comes into equity to obtain cancellation of a deed or
other equitable relief, it is generally held his misrepresentations as to age
will prevent recovery for the reason that he has not come into equity with
clean hands. Ostrander v. Quin, 84 Miss. 23o, 36 So. 257 (9o4); Levine v.
Brougham, 24 T. L. R. 8oi (9o8); Looney v. Elkhorn Land Co., i95 Ky.
For cases holding an infant is not affected by
x98, z4 S. W. 27 (i92_2).
the doctrine of equitable estoppel, see Sims v. Everhardt, ioz U. S. 313
(i8o) ; Tobin v. Spann, 85 Ark. 556, io9 S. V. 534 (i9o8).
Different views are taken by the courts as to the circumstances under
which the infant will be estopped. Mere silence, it is held, will not have
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this effect; Williamson v'. Jones, 43 W. Va. 562, 27 S. E. 411 (r897); although the infant knows the other party believes him to be of age. Baker.
v. Stone, 136 Mass. 405 (188 4 ); Buchanan v. Hubbard, 96 Ind. i (1884).
Some courts hold that nothing short of active misrepresentation as to age
will estop the infant. Pemberton Bldg. Asso. v. Adams, 53 N. J. Eq. 258
Vx At. 28o (1895); Confederation Life Asso. v. Kinnear, 23 Ont. App. 497
(180).
The better view, however, seems to be that positive misrepresentation
is not necessary to bar :he infant from relief, but that any active concealment of age, when the infant has arrived at the age of discretion, coupled
with the fact that his personal appearance indicates he has reached his
majority, is sufficient. Commander v. Brazile, 88 Miss. 668, 41 So. 497
(19o6); Stallard v, Sutherland, 131 Va. 316, ioS S. 1. 568 (i92i); Lewis v.
Van Cleeve, 302 Ill. 413, 134 N. E. 8o4 (192).
Statutes have been passed in Kansas, 'Washington and Iowa preventing
an infant from disaffirming a contract induced by misrepresentation as to
age. 3r C. J. ioo7.
It is submitted that, although the decision in the instant case goes quite
far in estopping the infant in an action at law, it has, none the less, much to
commend it. There seems to be no satisfactory reason why the infant
should be permitted to defraud others whom he has misled, either in law or
equity. In this connection the remarks of Lord Mansfield in Touch v.
Parons, 3 Burr. I794 (1,63), are pertinent: "The privilege of infancy-shall
protect him from fraud and oppression, but shall not be turned into an
offensive weapon to assist fraud and oppression."
INJUNCTIoN-PRoTEcIo-;

OF PEsGNAL RIGHTs-HuSBAND

AND WIFM-

The plaintiff, a man of highly nervous and excitable nature, had been objecting for some time to the fact that his wife's employer consorted with
her. He requested the court to grant an injunction restraining the defendant
from associating with his wife after office hours. Held: The injunction
should be granted. Witte v. Banderer, 255 S. W. ioi6 (Texas, 1923).
It is a general rule that a court of equity will only interfere by injunction when a property right is involved. Corless v. Walker Co., 57 Fed.
That
434 (1893); Chappel v. Stewart, 82 Aid. 323, 33 At. 542 (896).
there can be no injunctive relief against injury to one's feelings or for the
protection of the right of privacy has been commonly declared by the courts
and by the text writers on equity jurisprudence. Chappel v. Stewart, .upra;
High, Injunctions (4th ed., 19o5) 34. In a considerable number of cases,
however, the courts have based their jurisdiction nominally on an alleged
property right, when in reality the only right involved was one of reputation or privacy. Woolsey v. Judd, 4 Duer 379 (N. Y. 1855) ; ex parte Warfield, 4o Tex. Crim. 413, 5O S. W. 933 (1899). But in Louisiana, where the
civil law obtains, it has been directly asserted that an injunction may be
granted to protect a purely personal right. Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, xxS.La.
479, 39 So. 499 (1905).
In the instant case the Texas Court stands as an upholder of the
doubtful doctrine fostered by the dissenting justices in the case of Robeson
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v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 17i N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 44o (igo), where it
was suggested that "where there is an alleged invasion of some personal
right or privilege, the absence of exact precedent, and the fact that early
commentators upon the common law have no discussion upon the subject,
are of: no material importance in awarding equitable relief. That the exercise of the preventive power of a court of equity is demanded in a novel
case is not a fatal objection."
At least it can be said that no other common law courts have successfully applied the injunctive remedy merely to preserve the peace of mind
of a husband.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONs-LIABILITY FOa NEGLIGENCE OF EmPLOyEEs.-The
plaintiff while standing at the side of the street was injured by an automobile truck, the property of the city, loaded with ashes and operated by an employee of the city, the vehicle being engaged at the time in conveying the
ashes from a centralization plant to one of its dumps. In an action against
the city for damages, held: no recovery. Scibilia v. Philadclphia, Pa. Supreme Ct., January Term, i924, No. 315.
The courts everywhere repeat the formula that "a city when acting in
its public capacity cannot be held liable for negligence of its servants, although it is liable when it is acting in its private or proprietary capacity."
Hill v. Boston, 122 Mass. 344 (1877); Kansas City v. Lemen, 57 Fed. goS
Th
(1893) ; Long Beach v. Chafor, 174 Cal. 478, 163 Pac. 67o (ipi9).
reasons assigned for non-liability in public functions are principally that
the city is a body politic established as an administrative agent of the sovereign. Dillon, Municipal Corporations, (5th ed., i9it) 59; or, as intimated
in the instant case, that money appropriated for public purposes should not
be paid to private individuals. Boyd v. Fire Insurance Patrol, n~o Pa. 624
(1888) ; O'Connell v. Merchants' and Police Telegraph, 167 Ky. 468, i8o
S. W. 845 (i915). For a discussion of other reasons, and criticisms of
them, see 34 HA.v. L. Rnv. 68.
To the part of the above rule as to non-liability there are exceptions.
Thus a city, though acting in its public capacity, is liable for creating a nuisance. Noonan v. City of Albany, 79 N. Y. 470 (1879); Field v. West
Orange, 36 N. J. Eq. 183 (1883); Briegel v. Phila., 135 Pa. 45i, i9 At. 1o38
(i8go). This exception is based on historical precedent rather than on reason. Scibilia v. Phila., supra. So also the city is liable where, though it
acts in a public capacity, the state has required of it absolute and imperative duties. Rochester White Lead Co. v. Rochester, 3 N. Y. 463 (1850);
Parmenter v. Marion, 113 Iowa 297, 85 N. W. goo (1892); Ludlow v. Fargo,
3 N. D. 485, 57 N. W. 56 (1893).
The courts are not clear as to when the act is public or private within
the meaning of the rule. It seems that where the city undertakes to act
with a view to profit it acts in its private capacity. People v. Detroit, 28
Mich. 28 (873); Hill v. Boston, supra; Winona v. Bolzet, 169 Fed. 321
(s 9). The inference would seem to be that all other acts are public.
But where the city is fulfilling a duty which is discretionary even
though public, it is not liable for the negligence of its servants in perform-
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ing that duty. Jones v. New Haven, 34 Conn. i (i867); McDade v. Ches.
ter, 117 Pa. 414 (1887); Foard v. Maryland, 219 Fed. 827, 135 C. C. A.
497 (1914). Thus, having dttermined the act to have been in a public capacity, it is further necessary to determine whether it was in the performance
of an absolute or of a discretionary duty.
In trying to pigeon-hole each act under this last test the courts are in
hopeless. confusion. Thus a city has been held exempt from liability, where
it was building a drawbridge; Daly v. New Haven, 69 Conn. 644, 38 Atl.
397 (1897); maintaining a health department; Howard v. Phila., supra;
Leavell v. Western Kentucky Asylum, 122 Ky. 213, 91 S. NV. 671 (i9o6).;
sweeping and cleaning streets (analogous to the present case); Haley v.
Boston, 191 Mass. 291, 7- N. E. 888 (iqo6). Harris v. District of Columbia,
n56 U. S. 65o (i92); contra, street cleaning, Missano v. New York, i6o
N. Y. 123, 54 N. E. 744 (T899); Ferdanez v. Pass Christian, boo Miss. 76,
56 So. 329 (I911); failure to maintain a sewer, Johnson v. District of
Columbia, zx8 U. S. 1g (i888); contra, Murphy v. Lowell, 124 Mass. s16
(1877) ; using a defective steam roller to repair highway, Albert v. Muskegon,
146 Mich. 210, 1o9 N. W. 262 (z9o6) ; fire department, Grant v. Erie, 69 Pa.
4-o (i87); but compare Ries v. Erie, x69 Pa. 598, 32 At. 621 '(1895) ; educational facilities, Hill v. Boston, supra; contra, Johnston v. Chicago, 258
Ill.
494, 1o N. E. 96o (i9r3). For an exhaustive.list see 'White, Negligence
of Municipal Corporation (1920), sec. 50 et seq.; Dillon, supra, 164o et seq.
The instant case follows the majority of jurisdictions in holding that the
removal of rubbish is a governmental and discretionary function.
It is submitted that, unless some definite test be found to distinguish
public from private acts, and discretionary from absolute duties, the rules of
non-liability are meaningless. The non-liability might be put on the ground
that a city even though exercising a mandatory duty should not be liable
for collateral negligence of its employees. Albert v. Muskegon, supra; City
of Eldorado v. Scruggs, 113 Ark. 239, 168 S. W. 846 (1914).
PAnNS-WHEN GOVERNOR IS ABsENT.-The Governor of the state was
out of the jurisdiction for six hours. He did not ask the lieutenant governor to act for him. The constitution provided that "When the Governor
shall be absent . . . from the State, the Lieutenant Governor shall discharge the duties of said office." . . . During the six hours the lieuten"
ant governor granted a pardon. -geld:The pardon was valid. Montgomery
v. Cleveland, 98 So. iii (Miss. 1923).
The lieutenant governor could only properly act if the governor was
absent. The sole point to be considered then is whether the governor was
"absent" within the meaning of the constitution. It is a fundamental rule
of interpretation that. a statute "is to be expounded according to the intent
of them that made it." Maxwell, Interpretation of Statutes (6 ed., 190) 1.
This rule applies to constitutions. Watkins v. Mooney, 14 Ky. 646, 71
S. W. 62z (19o3). The word "absent" has a technical meaning according to
the legal subject matter to which the word is applied. i C. J. 342. In
arriving at their- conclusions in cases like the principal one the courts have
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been confronted with two problems: first, that there should always be some
one capable of administering the laws at the head of the government; second, that the mere stepping outside the borders of the state should not give
an opportunity to the successor to disrupt the administration and policy of
the government. The better view would seem to be that the legislature
meant "effective absence" as distinguished from "physical absence," State
v. Graham, 28 La. 568 (1874). State v. Lahiff, 146 Wis. 49o, 131 N. W. 824"
(1911) ; and that effective absence is such as renders him incapable for the
time being of performing the act which requires immediate execution. Detroit v. Moran, 46 Mich. 213, 9 N. W. 252; Watkins v. Mooney, 114 Ky.
Pardon is a matter of grace and discretion;
646, 7I S. W. 6z- (i9o3).
United States v. Wilson, 7 'Pet. i6o (U. S. 1833); and in the instant case
it did not fall into the class of acts which "require immediate execution."
In addition to the principal case; in re Crump, 135 Pac. 428 (Okla., 1913),
on facts very similar, held that the pardon granted by the lieutenant governor was valid. For the reasons set out above, it is submitted that
these two cases are wrongly decided.
T.kXATIO--EDERAL ESTATE TAX-"NEr EsTATE."--The Federal Estate
Tax Act of February 24, 19T9 (ch. 18, 40 St. 1057, 1096) section 401, imposes upon "the transfer of the net estate of eveiy decedent dying after the
passage of this act" taxes equal to certain specified percentages of the value
of the net estate. The government in computing the value of the net estate
upon which the tax was to be leyied added to the otherwise taxable estate the
unknown Federal Estate tax. Held: The tax should not have been included
in the taxable net estate. Edwavrds v. Slocum ai al, U. S. S. C., Advance
Sheets, No. 276, October Term, 1923.
The Federal estate tax is a tax on the transfer of the net estate by the
decedent rather than a tax on the receipt of the property by the legatees or
a tax on the residuary estate. See the recent case of'Young Men's Christian Association et al. v. Davis et al., infra. The Federal Act specifies the
criteria by which the net estate shall be ascertained, and expressly exempts
all gifts to charity. Since the residue here was given to charity, it was not
part of net estate; and the amount of the tax, though payable out of such
residue, is held not to be a part of the net estate. The act does not provide that the unknown estate tax shall be included in the taxable estate, but
infers that the net estate shall be ascertained before the tax is computed.
To hold otherwise would be to have an unknown on each side of the equation, which would necessitate algebraic formulm in computing the tax. As
Hough, J., said in Edwards v. Slocum e al., 287 Fed. 651 (C. C. A. 1923),
"Algebraic formula are net lightly to be imputed to legislators." It is also,
contrary to long established usage to include the incidence of the tax in the
taxable estate.
TAXATIoN-FEDERAL ESTATE TAX-PAYABLE OuT oF RESIDUARY ESTATE.Testator after giving certain legacies bequeathed the residue of his property to charity. The executor pdid an estate tax under the Revenue Act of
i918, enacted February 24, i919 (ch. i8, 40 St. 1057, xo96). The question
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involved was whether the tax should be deducted from the amounts.about
to be distributed to the specific legatees and devisees or from the residuary
estate. Held: From the residuary estate. Young Men's Christian Association
di al. v. Davis ct aL, U. S. S. C., Advance Sheets, No. 249, October Term,
1923.

The Estate Tax Act imposes "a tax . . . equal to the following
percentages of the value of the net estate . . . upon *the transfer of the
net estate." The Act of 19z8 is an amended version of the Act of x916
(39 Stat. L 756), which was declared to be constitutional in New York
Trust Co. et aL, as executors of Purdy v. Eisner, 256 U. S. 345 (1921).
The law has long recognized the difference between an estate tax and a
legacy or succession tax. An estate tax is a tax on the right or privilege
of the owner to transmit property at his death. A legacy or succession tax
is a tax on the right or privilege of the legatees to receive the property.
Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 4t, 49 (189); Hanson, Death Duties (6th
ed.), 4o. An estate tax is a charge on the estate and like any other debt is
paid out of the residue. Plunkett et al. v. Old Colony Trust Co. et al, 233
Mass. 471, 124 N. E. 265 (1919). It is only on failure of residue that it is
payable pro rata out of the shares that are to go to legatees. A legacy or
succession tax is payable pro rata out of the shares which will go to the
specific legatees.
Knowlton v. Moore, supra. It has been decided by
the Supreme Courts of two states that the Federal Estate Tax is an estate
tax and is payable out of the residuary estate. In re Hamlin et al., 226 N.
Y. 4o7, 124 N. E. 4 (igg); Plunkett et aL. v. Old Colony Trust Co. et al.,
supra. Several courts have expressed similar opinions in dicta. Corbin *v.
Townshend, 92 Conn. 5oi, 1o3 Atl. 647 (igi8); Estate of Ferdinand W.
Roebling, deceased, 89 N. J. Eq. i63, io4 Atl. 295 (1918). Under the English statutes "estate duties" are payable out of the residue. 13 Halsbury's
Laws of England 219 (i1o); Parker v. Pullen, I Ch. 564 (Eng. i9io).
The Supreme Court seems clearly to be right in deciding that the
above-mentioned tax is an estate tax payable out of the residue. (i) The
title to the act provides for an "estate tax." (2) Section 408 provides that
unless otherwise directed by the testator the tax shall be paid out of the
estate before distribution. (3) The measure of the tax is the value of.the
net estate and no mention of legacies is made in this connection. (4) The
terms of the act present a striking contrast to the terms of the act interpreted by Knowlton v. Moore, supra, to be a legacy tax. (5) The framers
intended that this be an estate tax. Report of July 5, 1916, Report No.
922, 64th Congress, 1st Session, page 5. Since- the tax is on the transmission
of the property from the deceased and not on the residue, the fact that the
residue was given to charity should not change the result.
TORTS-INPANTS-PRE-NATAL I.xjuRY.--The plaintiff was injured one
month and eleven days before birth through defendant's negligence. Held:
The plaintiff may recover. Kline v. Zuckerman, C. P. No. 2 (Phila.) Feb.,
1924.

A child en venlre sa mere has generally been accorded the same property and inheritance rights as if he were actually born. Biggs v. McCar-
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they, 86 Md. 352 (xS8z); McArthur v. Scott, 113 U. S. 34o (1885); 1 Bl.
Comm. z18 (Lewis' ed., 19o2). But by the weight of authority z. child can.
not sustain an action for injuries sustained before birth. Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (iS8 4 ); Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359,
56 N. E. 638 (xoo); 70 U. OF PA. L. REy. 355.
In the instant case, everything else necessary to the action having been
proved, the sole question upon which the case turned was whether the
plaintiff at the time of the injury had an individual existence by virtue of
which he had a personal right to be free from injury, the violation of which
would constitute a tort an the part of the defendant. The court rested its
decision largely upon the ground that as a matter of fact, discoverable by
science, a child does have a separate existence, a separate blood systemi etc.,
at some time before birth, so that, if the mother die, the child would live
when extracted. Cf. Boggs, J., in Allaire v.' St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill.
359 (79oo).1 It is submitted that the incident of acquiring a separate existence in law should be held to coincide with that of acquiring a separate existence in fact. Somewhere between conception and birth the law must
select a dividing line-a point, at which the child ceases to be merely a
part of the mother and becomes a distinct individual. Formerly, as shown
by cases cited supra, it was considered that this transformation took place
at birth. But there seems to be no reason for regarding birth as the point
of transformation, if it is not true as a matter of fact that then,- for the
first time, the child has a separate existence. There is nothing legally miraculous about birth per sc. A child is no more able to possess a legal intent nor to do a legal act immediately after its first breath than it is
immediately before it; nor should the mere fact that. it has taken the breath
have any legal consequence. And if the child in fact has a separate existence before birth, the fact that it is concealed en ventre sa mere should not
affect in any way the existence or non-existence of its personal rights. I
In The George and Richards, 24 Law Times 71V (Eng. 1871), a widow
brought art action on behalf of an unborn child under a statute giving the
widow and children compensation in cases where the negligent injury would
have given the father a right of action, had: death not ensued. In deciding
that the child could recover the court started with the proposition that "by
a legal fiction a legal personality is imputed to an unborn child for beneficial purposes . . ." To say that the child had a separate existence by a
"legal fiction" is to admit that he does not have an actual existence in law,
and to assume that he does not have it in fact. This is nothing more nor
less than judicial legislation in a somewhat veiled foim. In an attempt to
arrive at a conclusion which to the court seemed just, instead of merely
stating the conclusion on the grounds that it was just, it effected the same
result by going one step back of the conclusion to assume a premise from
which the conclusion irresistibly followed.
On the other hand by ruling as a matter of law that a child can have
no separate existence until birth, courts -which follow the majority rule,
supra, are arbitrarily denying a fact which may be shown to exist, and are
closing legal doors to a source of accurate knowledge which should, it is
submitted, be used, as should the knowledge of all facts, in thfe applicafion
of our legal principles.

RECENT CASES
TRUSTS--CHARITABLE

TRUsT-LAPSE OF TRUST ON DEATH OF TRUSTEE.-

Property was left by will to executors in trust "to be handled and used by
them as trustees, as they deem best, and .to whom they may decide best"
for the benefit of widows and orphans of the World War in certain parishes
in England. The executor died after distribution to him as trustee, but
before expending the entire amount. Testator's heir petitions for an accounting. Held: The trust lapsed. In re Chcfle'us Est., 221 Pac. 3 (Wash.
1923).

This will would create a valid charitable trust in England and in
almost all American jurisdictions, had the trustee carried out the trust.
Perry, Trusts (6th ed., 1911), see. 687; Russell v. Allen, io7 U. S. i63
(1882) ; Heskcth v. Murphy, 36 N. J. Eq. 304 (I882). Upon, the *death of
the trustee to whose discretion the distribution is entrusted, the Chancellor,
in England, would continue to enforce the trust on the theory that the
testator was more interested in the fulfillment of the charity than in the
exercise of discretion by the trustee.
One line of English cases holds that the Chancellor assumes jurisdiction by virtue of his prerogative power, acting for the King as parens pairhr;
Att'y Gen'l v. Matthews, 2 Lev. 167 (Eng., 1677); Att'y Gen'l v. Berryman,
Dick. 168 (Eng., 1755); Felan v. Russell, 4 Ir. Eq. Rep. 7oi (Eng., 1842).
In many American jurisdictions this view of the source of the Chancellor's
piower has been adopted, and they refuse to enforce the trust when the
trustee fails to exercise his discretion as to the objects, on the ground that
American courts do not have the prerogative power. Perry, Trusts (6th
ed., 1Dun), sec. 721; Hall v. Harvey, 77 N. H. 82, 88 AUt. 97 (1913); Beekman v. Bonsor, 23 N. Y. 298 (if6i).
Lord Eldon first suggested that a devise to charity is under the sign
manual, but a devise to a trustee for charity is under the ordinary chancery powers; Boyle, Charities (1837) 238; Moggridge v. Thackwell, 7 Ves.
Jr. 36 (8o3); Paice v. Archbishop of Canterbury, 14 Ves. Jr. .364 (8o7);
and a later line of English cases follows this view; Hayter v. Trego,
Russ. 113 (Eng., 183o); Att'y Gen'l v. Gladstone, 73 Sim. 7 (Eng., 184z);
Reeve v. Att'yGen'l, 3 Hare igr (Eng., 1843); In re Pyne, L, R. (9o3)
,
Ch. 88; senzble, In re Eades, L. R. (1920) 2 Ch. 353. It has been held in
Massachusetts, upon the authority of Lord Eldon, that, on the failure of
the trustee to appoint, the court has power to apply. the rest to charity.
Minot v. Baker, 14 Mass. 348, IV N. E. 839 (i888). Sherman v. Shaw, 4
Mass. 257. 137 N. E. 374 (1922).
In Pennsylvania it is provided by statute thit a charitable trust shall
not fail for want of a trustee, though such trustee is vested with. discretionary powers, and the objects of the trust are uncertain; Act of April 26,
1855 (P. L. 328), as amended by Act of May 23, 1895 (P. L. 114); De
Silver's Est., 211 Pa. 459, 6o Atl. 1O48 (igo5); Hutchinson's Est., 17 Pa.
Dist. R. 248 (i9o8); Cromwell's Est., i8 Pa. Dist. R. 157 (i9o8) " and it has
been said that these acts are only declaratory of the common law; Frazier
v. St. Luke's Church, z47 Pa. 256, 23 Atl. 44z (i8gr); though the contrary
view was once held; Zeissweiss v. James, 63 Pa. 465 (187o); Dunn's'Est., zo
W. N. C. 313 (Pa. i88I). Such cases as these must be distinguished from
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a naked power of appointment in favor of charity, not coupled with-a
trust. Att'y Gen'l v. Fletcher, 5 L. J. Ch. (N. S.) 75 (Eng., 1835); In re
Willis, L R. (1920) 2 Ch. 358; Fontain v. Ravenel, 58 U. S. 369 (1854).
(So explained in Minot v. Baker supra.) It is submitted that the rule in
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania is founded on better authority than the contrary American rule, and in the instant case would bring about a more satisfactory result, in that the continued distribution of the res to the widows and
orphans seems closer to the testator's intention than does the lapse of the
trust.
VoRKIEN'S

CO trE.VS.TrO,-"AccIDENT" AND

"IN

TnE COURSE

OF His

EMPLOYMENT.'--A miner who was working during a strike and who was
forced to remain on the premises because of danger of attack from the
strikers, was killed by a bomb thrown through the window of the bunk
house in which he slept. Held: The widow of the deceased can recover.
Malky v. Kiskinctas Valley Coal Co., 278 Pa. 552 (1924).
The English Workmen's Compensation Act provides that the injury
must be "by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment."
Workmen's Compensation Act, i9o6 (6 Edw. 7, c. 58), sec. 1. Practically
all the American acts have borrowed this phrase, the corresponding words
of the Pennsylvania act being "by accident, in the course of his employment," Acts of 1915, P. L 736, Art. I1, see. 3oi.
In order to be "in the course of his employment," it is not necessary
that the employee be actively engaged in doing the work which he was
employed to do at the very moment the injury occurred. Henderson v. Glasgow, 2 Fraser 1127 (Scot. Ct. Sess., 1goo); Dzikonska v. Sup. Steel Co.,
259 Pa. 578, io3 Atil. 351 (1918). He may recover if he is injured upon the
premises within a reasonable time before his work is to commence; Hills v.
Blair, 182 Mich. 2o, 148 N. W. 243 (1914); Milwaukee v. Althoff, 156 Wis.
68, 145 N. V. 238 (1914); Carlin v. Coxe Bro. & Co, 274 Pa. 38; 117 AtL.
4o5 (1922); or while riding home after work on a conveyance supplied by
the employer; Knorr v. C. R. R. of N. J., 268 Pa. 172, nio AtI. :f97 (192o);
or while rendering some service after hours. Grieb v. Hammerle, 222 N. Y.
382, xii N. E. 8o5 (i918).
It has been said that "since domestic servants and sailors are required.
to eat, sleep, and rest upon their masters" premises or vessel, they are clearly
within the course of their employment while doing so." Cf. Bohlen, 25 HAv.
L. REV. 41o, note 2o. And also that "the leisure of sailors on board a vessel
is as much in the course of their employment as their actual work." M€farshall v. S. S. "Wild Rose," 2 K. B. 46, 49 (Eng., igog). It has been specifically decided that a domestic servant injured while sleeping was injured in
the course of her employment. Alderidge v. Merry, 2 I. R. 308 (1913).
The fact that the injury was the result of a. criminal or wilful assault
by another does not exclude the possibility that it was caused by accident.
The murder of a cashier for the sake of robbery is an "accident" within
the statute. Nisbet v. Rayne & Burn, 2 K. B. 689 (Eng., igio). A game
keeper who is beaten by poachers suffers an injury by accident within the
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act. Anderson v. Balfour, 2 I. R. 497 (1910). So also does a section foreman who has been assaulted by a member of a gang, whom he had discharged. Western Indemnity Co. v. Pillsbury, i7o Cal. 686. 151 Pac. 398
(zgi5). It has even been held that an engine-driver, injured by a stone wilfully dropped from a bridge by a boy, was injured "by accident arising out
of and in the course of his employment." Challis v. -London & S. W. R.
Co., L. -R.2 K. B. 154 (Eng., x9o5).
In the light of the foregoing decisions, it is clear that the death of the
deceased was due to an accident which occurred during the course of his employment, and -that there can be a recovery under the Pennsylvania Act.

